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A political scientist at the University of Chicago and author of Origins of Alliances, 
Stephen Walt looks for patterns in the foreign relations of seven revolutionary regimes: 
the American, Chinese (Communist), French, Iranian, Mexican, Russian (Bolshevik), and 
Turkish. Revolution is "the destruction of an existing state by members of its own 
society, followed by the creation of a new political order." (p. 12) This definition 
excludes coups, anticolonial wars and most civil wars; the latter exclusion especially can 
present problems, as in the case of the Spanish conflict of the 1930s.  
Walt's guiding concept is the "balance of threat": revolution will most likely lead to war 
if a revolutionary state's neighbors perceive it as a serious threat to their external or 
internal arrangements. One must therefore consider not only the revolutionary state but 
the environment in which this state comes into being and acts. Balance of threat analysis 
explains very well why the recent revolutions in East Europe did not lead to war; not only 
did the new ruling circles not wish to challenge the West, indeed they wanted to bring 
their societies and policies into conformity with it. All this is fundamentally 
commonsensical; in the contemporary academic environment, there is much to commend 
demonstrating the commonsensical.  
East Europe aside, new revolutionary regimes have often found themselves at war, and 
Walt persuasively identifies a number of reasons for this. One is mutual misperception, 
produced on the one hand by the inability of anti-revolutionary states to obtain good 
information about the revolutionary regime's intentions and capabilities, and on the other 
by the revolutionaries' inexperience in international politics. Aggravating such 
inexperience is ideological preconception; most often, the ideology of the recently 
successful revolutionaries portrays outside states an incorrigibly hostile. Another factor 
making war more likely is internal divisions within the revolutionary regime, with one or 
more faction viewing war as a lever by which they can obtain or maintain power.  
War clearly does not require the stimulus of revolution: decades before Napoleon, Louis 
XIV was fighting European coalitions. But if not a necessary condition for war, Walt sees 
revolution as a sufficient one (p. 45): "revolutions have independent causal effects on the 
level of security competition and the probability of war." (p. 333) For instance, "the 
internal turmoil in France was directly responsible for the war that did break out and for 
its rapid expansion." (p. 332)  
Walt usefully distinguishes revolutions from below (more accurately, from outside the 
government) and elite revolutions (from within it). As a rule the latter, as in the Turkish 
and Mexican cases, are much less threatening to their neighbors; the US certainly did not 
perceive the Mexican Revolution as a serious threat to its domestic order. The situation 
prevailing in the international environment also importantly influences reaction to 
revolution: the Wilson administration might well have launched a serious invasion of 
Mexico had it not been distracted by its coming involvement in the Great War. In Turkey, 
Kemal was able to carry out his vast designs because the Allies were exhausted and at the 
same time free from threat from the Central Powers. Much the same could be said of the 
Bolshevik regime.  
Walt is sceptical of the utility of outside intervention against revolutionary regimes. 
Revolution is hard to export; however international its ideology, each revolution is 
society-specific. Besides, neighboring states take the revolution as a warning, 
safeguarding themselves against its spread by repression, reforms and alliances. 
Successful intervention against a revolutionary regime requires a tremendous 
commitment of force, which is often lacking, as in the efforts against the French and 
Bolshevik upheavals. Those instances also show that intervention can strengthen the 
revolution rather than eliminate it. Revolutionary regimes often overestimate their own 
strength and the sympathy for their cause in foreign countries, as in the Bolshevik case; 
hostile states in their turn overestimate the weaknesses of the new regimes and the 
strength of counterrevolutionary sentiment. Belief that Revolutionary France was 
militarily weak backfired because it led Austria and Prussia to wage only a half-hearted 
campaign. And deep divisions plague antirevolutionary coalitions, as in the 1790s and in 
1918-20.  
On other hand, Walt deprecates premature efforts to reach an accommodation with a new 
revolutionary regime, which the latter may view as an effort to re-establish foreign 
influence, and which thus may increase rather than lower friction.  
There is no section on Sandinista Nicaragua; Walt makes some puzzling bows in the 
direction of critical theory; and while the notes are excellent, one regrets the absence of a 
regular bibliography. But these are minor blemishes. Walt offers an impressive 
theoretical construction buttressed with useful synopses of complicated events and 
processes. The work is full of sound judgments expressed in clear prose. In fact, I like the 
book so well that I have adopted it as required reading for my course on Revolution.  
The author of Revolutionary States, Leaders, and Foreign Relations, Houman Sadri, is an 
assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida. Somehow 
convinced that the indifference of many young Americans to world affairs harms the 
ability of the US to function as the world's only superpower, he has written this book to 
overcome that debilitating indifference. Specifically, he sets out to show that the 
"behavior of revolutionary states is not irregular, irrational or unpredictable as many 
assume." (p. 2)  
Without making clear why he chose the three states in question, the author proceeds to 
improve the international understanding of American youth by advising the reader that 
"international and domestic concerns are merging in today's world," (p. 5) that "the tone 
of the foreign policy of a new regime is directly affected by whomever [sic] sets the 
policy agenda," (p. 15) that "the new leaders [of Maoist China, Castro Cuba and Islamist 
Iran] seemed [sic] to use anti-American rhetoric"(p. 120), that "revolutionary Cuba's 
geographical position was slightly [sic] different from that of China and Iran," (p. 122) 
that "in practice, one does not treat friend and foe equally," (p. 127) and so on. Although 
revolutionary China figures large in the book, the author makes only two brief references 
to Mao's Great Leap, which caused the deaths of perhaps 20 million Chinese, and 
mentions the Cultural Revolution not at all. There is no hint that before his takeover 
Castro had promised the Cubans not communism but democracy. And here is the main 
conclusion: "The differences among the Chinese, Cuban and Iranian strategies were 
primarily the result of their diverse backgrounds and the different sets of conditions with 
which they had to cope. The main differences included such factors as size and national 
wealth, military capabilities, leadership, institutional means and the nature of their 
foreign policies." (p. 115) So much for improving the understanding of American youth.  
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